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Abstract. Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we anal-
yse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian
state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Pois-
son) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able
purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are
derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The
analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by applications from financial mathematics, we assume below that
the flow of information reaching a market is influenced strategically by the
agents responsible for making and subsequently disclosing observations, sim-
ply because observations made by a self-interested agent can be suppressed.
For instance, suppose the agent’s self-interest manifests itself as wanting only
to report good news, and so to suppress bad news. If the cutoff that defines
whether an observation is good or bad news is defined relative to prior ex-
pectations, then the agent will disclose only observations above the prior.
A model of strategic reporting needs specifically to incorporate how poten-
tial recipients of disclosed observations (investors) can rationally respond to
silence from the agent, when absence of observation cannot credibly be indi-
cated by the agent and disclosure is not mandatory. We assume below that at
Poisson arrival times the agent is able to observe information, and has then
the option to disclose the observed information, but only truthfully, or to
suppress it (i.e. hide the ‘bad’ news). Then the question arises: what is the
optimal level of suppression. We answer below in Theorem 1 and Theorem
1m with explicit formulas in a multi-agent multi-period context. We work in
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a continuous Black-Scholes framework introducing the novel concept of an
optimal censor (§2.2). This combines censoring with filtering (for which see
[1], [2], [14], [27]). It is the key here. In particular we derive closed-form
exponential decay solutions for the optimal time-varying censor in periods of
silence; a new insight here is that penalization of silence is harshest at the
beginning (see §3.2 Corollary for details). These are the pleasing consequence
of moving to continuous time: simplification of the natural equilibrium con-
ditions (e.g. (1) in §2.3 and in §3.1.1; cf. (10)) to a first-order differential
equation (see (6) in §3.1); a transparent narrative at the single agent level;
a rich joint asset-price dynamic, via the repercussions on each other, of a
stream of disclosures from the multiplicity of correlated agents. This paper
is a sequel to our previous work, where such questions were pursued in a
discrete two-period setting (in [30] and [19] for the case of one firm, and in
[18] where further reality is added via a communication game with multiple
competitors in an industry correlated by common operating conditions). We
were motivated by the static-setting literature of costly state verification (e.g.
by Townsend [34] in 1979 – see the later literature in [23]), and of corporate
disclosure introduced by Dye [16] in 1985 (and the associated paper [22]).
The additional results in §4 highlight consequences of our main theo-
rems for the bandwagon and quality effects in the current setting. These
qualitative results extend our findings in the two-period model of [18]. For
instance: when competing managers are endowed with different observation
noise, those managers that observe with most noise use a lower censor and
hence suppress bad news less. But then this means that, when investors
see slightly-below-mean observations being disclosed by such managers, they
rationally interpret this as being from a more noisy source, and so discount
its importance when updating.
A broadly similar class of models arises in the engineering literature study-
ing alternation between observation (‘measurement’) and control, typically
in a discrete-time setting, but there the alternation is the result of a trade-off
between the two actions, dictated by a single indicator of overall performance
of a system (i.e. a suitable objective function); a related class considers in-
termittent receipt of measurements/observations, but there the suppression
is caused by random transmission failures – see e.g. [9], [21], [32].
In discrete time, Shin [31] introduced (in 2004) a model of a firm, en-
gaged in a flow of projects, receiving information with a Poisson distribution
concerning the status (success or failure) of projects completed to date. By
endowing the firm with the opportunity at each date of a full or partial dis-
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closure of that information, he created an asset-pricing framework in which
such disclosures are endogenously determined, and so could study equilibrium
patterns of corporate disclosure.
In continuous time, Brody, Hughston and Macrina [8] introduced (in
2007) an asset-pricing framework based on noisy market-observation of con-
tinuous information that is generated from the remaining future disclosures,
occuring at pre-determined (‘mandatory’) dates. Similarly to Shin, their
disclosures are modelled as a discrete series of random variables; the latter
give rise to a stream of uncertain payouts (cash flows) corresponding to the
mandatory dates. The individual cash values are taken to be deterministic
functions of independent random variables called ‘market-factors’ (not un-
like our terminal-time output variable Z1), but with the inclusion only of
those that are capable of being observed by the modeller at and prior to
the date of disclosure. Typically the market’s noisy observation is a linear
combination of the future payouts, each weighted by a coefficient that gains
increasing prominence over time, and Brownian-bridge components, which
vanish at the corresponding payout-dates. However, in contrast to Shin, all
the disclosures are mandatory and the possibility of voluntary intermittent
disclosures (say via a zero dividend) is not studied.
In a recent development, Marinovic and Varas [28] (in 2014) consider a
voluntary disclosure model in continuous time, in which a single agent unin-
terruptedly observes an asset following a {0, 1}-valued random walk. (The
binary aspect leads to market-price decay, which like ours is exponential.)
In creating a multi-asset Black-Scholes asset-pricing framework in which
corporate disclosures are endogenously determined, our work is closest in
spirit to Shin [31]. It is also closer in spirit with some of the earlier literature
of portfolio/consumption analysis under incomplete information, e.g. Feld-
man’s model in 1992 ([17]; cf. literature cited there) of a production exchange
economy, where realized outputs are observed (whereas in the model below
a noisy version of the output process Zt is observed), and provide via a non-
linear filter an information flow on the underlying economic state process (a
‘productivity’ factor, following an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck mean-reverting pro-
cess).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §2, abstracting away
from the market motivation, we exploit in §2.1 some of the ideas of standard
filtering theory to describe scalar observations by m individuals (‘agents’)
that are made intermittently in the interval (0, 1) privately (i.e. in secret),
and either kept secret or disclosed (reported) to the other agents and in-
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vestors. The observation processes have a co-dependance, as do also cer-
tain other scalar processes which assign a valuation to each agent. This
co-dependance is determined by a single state-process called the common
effect. The shared information, together with the initial mandatory obser-
vation values of time t = 0, provides the basis upon which to forecast each
individual’s valuation at the terminal time t = 1 of the next mandatory
disclosure.
Agents disclose their observations in order to enhance at each moment the
forecast of their terminal valuation, which is contingent on the mandatory
disclosures at the terminal time. This leads to an optimization problem
stated in §2.2. If each agent discloses only observations above their censoring
threshold, keeping secret lower observed values, silence at any moment in
(0, 1) can mean either the absence of observation, or its censoring (since the
arrival of an undisclosed observation remains secret, and the agent is not
able to assert credibly the absence of a current observation). Since periods
of silence bring precautionary valuation downgrades, the threshold drops
over time, pari passu, to elicit a disclosure; additional tensions arise from
potential disclosures from other agents, so subgame perfect Nash equilibria
considerations enter the argument – see §3.
Section 2.3 interprets the individual valuation as the market value of the
firm obtained from information disclosed to the market by managers making
discretionary (i.e. non-mandatory) disclosures in between the two mandatory
disclosure times of t = 0 and t = 1.
Our two main results are stated and discussed in §3 and proved in §5.2,
§5.3. In §4 the interpretation of §2.3 is used to describe, as immediate
corollaries of earlier work, qualitative features of a multi-agent correlated
sector.
We focus on valuations inferred from periods of silence hence the title.
2 Model
We first formalize the disclosure framework in a series of steps.
2.1 Processes and filtrations
We fix a stochastic basis (Ω,F ,F,Q), with F := {Ft : t ∈ [0, 1]}.
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2.1.1. State process setup. The production of m ≥ 1 scalar processes
from one (vector) process, and the uncertainties connected with this, will be
modelled in terms of the fixed (F-Q)-Wiener processWt = (W
0
t ,W
1
t , ...,W
m
t ),
more precisely in terms of exponential martingales X and M i defined from
the independent component processes of W, employing correspondingly the
entries of the real vector σ = (σX0 , σ
M
1 , . . . , σ
M
m ) ≥ 0 as follows1:
dXt/Xt = σ
X
0 dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, 1] ,
dM it/Mt = σ
M
i dW
i
t , t ∈ [0, 1] ,
for every i ∈ I := {1, . . . , m}; here we assume as known the respective
distributions at time-0 of these processes.
The process X has the dual roles of (economic) state process and signal
process, and is regarded as representing a common effect that influences the
individual internal histories via two processes as follows.
2.1.2 Ouput process. The output process Zt = (Z
1
t , ..., Z
m
t ), whose termi-
nal state at time t = 1 is to be forecast, encodes the production of m signals
from the state process as its single input; taking values in Rm, it is defined
componentwise by a weighted power-law:
Z it = ζ
i(Xt), where ζ
i(x) = f ixαi ,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}; here f i is the size constant of the i-th output and αi is
termed the i-th loading exponent (loading factor), both positive, yielding the
terminal output vector Z1. The exponent, which measures the exposure of a
firm to common effects, enables empirical interpretation but is mathemati-
cally of little consequence (as though it had the value 1). To add a technical
remark, it will be convenient in the proofs to rescale such a process to have
size unity at some date, contingent on the available information, a procedure
we call common-sizing.
2.1.3 Internal history process. The internal history process Yt = (Y
1
t , . . . , Y
m
t )
provides the source of intermittent noisy observations (which are to be selec-
tively disclosed) of the output process Zt; as this is to be a partially observable
process, the construction uses the martingaleM = (M1, . . . ,Mm) as a linear
1Our choice of working with exponential martingales, indeed with Dole´ans-Dade expo-
nentials, is natural in a setting where a critical equation involves equity values rather than
returns: see Prop. 1 below and especially the equity valuation equation (3), as well as the
interplay of the key equations: (7), (8) [equivalently, (9)], and likewise (10).
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noise to modify the output process:
Yt = ZtMt,
that is, componentwise: Y it = Z
i
tM
i
t = f
iXαit M
i
t .
2.1.4 Regression parameters. We collect regression parameters associated
with the processes defined so far. Put σi := σ
M
i /αi, and define the associated
precisions
pi := 1/σ
2
i and p = pagg := p0 + p1 + ...+ pm;
for convenience, we use dual notation for the regression coefficients (relative
precisions):
κi or κ
i
m := pi/p and κ
i
1 = pi/(p0 + pi) for m = 1 with i the solitary firm.
2.1.5 Private observation process and private filtration. The observation
of the economic realities embodied in the processes X , Y , and Z is mod-
elled as an intermittent partial observation arising for an individual economic
agent with label in {1, . . . , m}, and expressed as a private observation pro-
cess Y i-obs. The constructions of these concepts below starts from a (ca`dla`g)
Poisson process Nt = (N
1
t , ..., N
m
t ) which is independent of the Wiener pro-
cesses Wt of §2.2.1 and whose vector of intensity functions λt = (λ1t , . . . , λmt ),
the information arrival rate, is inhomogeneous and also known. The arrival
times in (0, 1) of each component process N i are regarded as consecutively
numbered, with θi-obsn denoting the n-th of these; that is, on setting θ
i-obs
0 = 0,
θi-obsn := inf{t > θi-obsn−1 : N i(t) > N i(t−)}.
The intended meaning of this is that the i-th agent observes the process Y i-obs
privately, and only at these arrival time in (0, 1); the last observation time
at or prior to t and the corresponding last observed value are
θi-obs− (t) = max{s ≤ t : N i(s) > N i(s−)},
Y i-obs(t) = Y i(θi-obs− (t)).
The resulting process Y i-obs is the private observation process of agent i. It is
piecewise constant, and defines the private filtration of the i-th agent. This
is the (time indexed) family Yprivi of σ-algebras generated by the jumps at
or before time t, and by the observations at or before time t, here regarded
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as space-time point-processes (i.e. with their dates – for background see [12,
esp. II Ch. 15] ); it is formally given by
Y
priv
i := {Y it : t ∈ [0, 1]}, where Y it := σ({(s, Y i-obs(s), N i(s)) : 0 < s ≤ t}) ,
for t ∈ (0, 1), where we let Y i0 contain all the null sets of F .
2.1.6 Public filtration. The public filtrations Gpub, to be constructed next,
formalize the notion of ‘information disclosed via the publicly observed his-
tory of Y ’. Their construction begins with a fixed marked point-process2
(MPP) comprising the following list of items (i) to (iv).
(i) The underlying ca`dla`g counting process Npubt (‘the disclosure time pro-
cess’),
(ii) The functions θpub± , where θ
pub
− (t) is the last arrival time of N
pub
t less than
or equal to t, and θpub+ (t) is the first arrival time of N
pub
t bigger than or equal
to t, these relations holding almost surely on Ft, for every t in [0, 1].
(iii) The point process Jt ⊆ I := {1, . . . , m} (‘the disclosing agent set of time
t’).
(iv) The marks Y j-pubt = Y
j-obs(θpub− (t)) for j ∈ Jt (‘their corresponding
observations of time t’).
In terms of the MPP as above we obtain the publicly observed history, or
public filtration, which is right-continuous and constructed in the three steps
below:
G = Gpub := {G+t : t ∈ [0, 1]} ,
where G+1 = σ(G1, {(1, Y i(1))}i∈I) and for each t in [0, 1), conventionally
G+t =
⋂
s>t
Gs,
with the σ-algebras Gt generated as the join of the three σ-algebras corre-
sponding to the items (i), (iii) and (iv) from §2.1.6, dates included, namely:
Gt = ∨s∈[0,t)σ
(
(s,Npub(s)), Js, {(s, Y j-pub(s))}j∈Js
)
.
2.1.7 Disclosure filtration. The key concept for the paper is that of a public
2As the Referee points out, it possible to construct the public filtration entirely from a
vector of Poisson processes (with appropriate thinning), so that ‘disclosers’ are identified
by coincidence of certain arrival times.
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filtration G (in the sense of §2.1.6) which is a particular kind of subfiltration
of the join ∨iYprivi of the private filtrations of §2.1.5. Its definition hinges
on disclosure of observations at or above the current value of a ‘reference
process’ γ which, crucially, is required to be predictable with respect to the
public information that it itself generates.
We define the disclosure filtrations consistently generated from the (pri-
vate) filtrations {Yprivi : i ∈ I} via the G-predictable censoring filter γ =
(γit : i ∈ I), to be public filtrations satisfying additionally the following three
conditions for each 0 < t < 1. These say that at each disclosure time there
are disclosing agents as in (v), with their observations made public, as in
(vi), because, as in (vii), these are above their censoring thresholds:
(v) The set Jt is non-empty iff N
pub(t) > Npub(t−).
(vi) If Npub(t) > Npub(t−), then Y j-pub(t) = Y j-obs(t), for each j ∈ Jt.
(vii) If N i(t) > N i(t−) and Y i-obst > γit, for some i ∈ I,
then Npub(t) > Npub(t−) and i ∈ Jt.
For such a filtration Gpub, the counting-process arrival times occuring in
(0, 1) in (ii) of §2.1.6 will be termed the voluntary disclosure event times (or
just disclosure times if m = 1): θpub0 , θ
pub
1 , ... .
2.2 Optimal censoring problem
Associated with a fixed disclosure filtrationG = {G+t }, consistently generated
via γ as in §2.1.7, is the process obtained by taking contingent expectations
of the time-1 output Z1 with respect to the time-t information subsets:
t 7→ E[Z i1|Gt] ;
this process is interpreted as aG-predictable valuation process orG-forecasting
process. The optimal censoring problem addressed below calls for the con-
struction of a filtration G∗, necessarily unique, whose associated forecasting
process is the left-sided-in-time pointwise supremum over all G-forecasting
processes, that is, for each time t ∈ (0, 1) and each agent i,
E[Z i1|G∗,t] = supG E[Z i1|Gt], (OC)
where the supremum ranges over the disclosure filtrations G = {G+t } of
§2.1.7. In (OC) both sides of the equation depend only the public information
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available to the left of the date3 t. By definition such a G∗, if it exists, is
unique. The main results of the paper give the solution in §3 of the optimal
censoring problem for the geometric Brownian signal processes X of §2.1;
Theorem 1 corresponds to the one-dimensional case m = 1, Theorem 1m to
the case of arbitrary integer dimension m ≥ 1.
Remarks 1. Informally, the censoring problem requires agent i to reach
disclosure/suppression decisions using only the history of all prior public
information.
2. With the filtering theory language above, the optimal censoring problem
amounts to the construction of a censoring-filter (process) γt with the fol-
lowing properties (i) to (iii):
(i) the disclosure subfiltration G of ∨i∈IYprivi , generated through suppression
of observations by reference to the process γ, is consistently generated from
the private filtrations {Yi : i = 1, ..., m};
(ii) γ is G-predictable (this is crucial);
(iii) for each i ∈ I and for each time instant t ∈ (0, 1), γit is chosen to be
a cutoff maximizing the expected value of Z i1, given only past public infor-
mation, and best response to the simultaneous censoring choices of γjt for
j 6= i (which is why γ needs to be G-predictable). Of course, this yields an
individual private valuation for each agent.
3. The role of G above is to formalize the censoring of the private observation
processes relative to information ‘public’ before any time-t disclosure, so in
general distinct from the optional valuation process of the next section (§2.3)
E[Z i1|G+t ],
which models the later right-continuous public valuation at time t.
4. In Remark 2 the agent is a maximizer of an instantaneous objective linked
to the terminal output (via its estimator). The alternative approach is to
establish a single overall performance indicator for the entire trajectory of
the estimator. Optimality of overall economic behaviour induced by instan-
taneous (sometimes called ‘myopic’) objectives is established for a class of
models related to ours in Feldman [17].
3It is highly significant to the analysis that the date t is inferable from the conditioning
σ-algebra Gt (likewise for Yit ), hence its inclusion in the construction.
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2.3 Application to asset-price modelling
We consider a single ‘firm’ Z it in isolation, so omitting i when convenient. The
manager of the firm (agent i) makes a mandatory declaration at time t = 1
of its (fundamental) value which, taking a Bayesian stance, is the manager’s
estimate/forecast of the firm’s economic state Z1 using Y1, namely
γ˜1 := E[Z1|G1, Y1] = E[Z1|G+1 ],
since G+1 = σ((1, Y1),G1). Below we use a standard martingale construction
to create an asset-price process under Q (cf. [6]); we then note the option
values that censoring introduces, and observe that a censor, which induces
indifference between disclosure and non-disclosure, preserves the risk-neutral
character of the asset-price under Q.
Given a public filtration G, the associated forecasting process of §2.2.
yields an analogue S of an asset-price process with
St := E[E[Z1|G+1 ]|G+t ], for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
This construction also turns the reference measure Q (of the stochastic
basis) into a risk-neutral valuation measure, a fact implied by the conditional
mean formula, which for t < s asserts that
E[Ss|G+t ] = E[E[E[Z1|G+1 ]|G+s ]|G+t ] = E[E[Z1|G+1 ]|G+t ] = St.
The disclosure cutoff γ is uniquely determined below by the asset-price pro-
cess S, as follows. Fix t < s. At time t suppose that agent i is committed
to using a cutoff γt and is to choose a disclosure cutoff γ for use at the later
date s. Assume, until further notice, absence of any public disclosures in the
interval (t, s). Let Ds(γ) be the disclosure event of time s corresponding to
the agent i observing a value of Ys at or above γ, so that in terms of indicator
functions
1Ds(γ) = 1N(s)>N(s−) · 1Y (s)≥γ . (D)
Equation (D) suggests that the Black-Scholes value of the one-or-nothing
binary option on Ys with strike γ (represented by 1Y (s)≥γ) will emerge at the
heart of our line of reasoning.
Next consider the complementary event NDs(γ) in which, given γ, the
market computes a forecast for Z1 as being γ˜s = E[Z1|NDs(γ),G+t ]. If the
agent wishes to maximise the asset valuation S at time s the choice γ will
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induce indifference between disclosure and non-disclosure when Ys = γ is
observed iff4
E[Z1|Ys = γ,G+t ] = E[Z1|NDs(γ),G+t ].
This observation and conditioning on knowledge at time t of the value5
γ˜t := E[Z1|G+t ]
induces the following simple relation between the equilibrium value γ˜s and
γ˜t. (An even simpler limiting form arises in Theorem 1 in §3.1.) The relation
involves the distribution of Zests := E[Z1|Ys,G+t ], i.e of the time-s estimator
of the terminal output Z1, conditional on the observation of Ys by the agent.
(In (2) below, direct substitution causes a spurious inner conditioning; the
Landau notation below has the sense: o(h)/h→ 0, as h ↓ 0.)
Proposition 1 (Conditional Bayes formula; cf. [22]). In the single
agent setting, conditional on there being no disclosure in the interval (t, s),
with γ˜t := E[Z1|G+t ] and γ˜s := E[Z1|Ys = γs,G+t ], the equation
γ˜s = E[Z1|NDs(γs), G+t ] (1)
is equivalent for qts := (s− t)λt to
(1− qts)(γ˜t − γ˜s) + o(s− t) = qts
∫
z≤γ˜s
(z − γ˜s)dQ(Zests ≤ z|G+t )
= qts
∫
z≤γ˜s
(z − γ˜s)dQ(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ z|G+t ).(2)
The proof is in §5.1. The ‘indifference choice’ of γ is of significance: we
cite our earlier result here as:
Proposition 2 (Risk neutrality, [30] – cf. [19]). In the setting of Propo-
sition 1, with D = Ds(γ) and τ
t
D := Q[D|G+t ], its market probability (condi-
tional at time t), equation (1) is equivalent to
St = E[S1|G+t ] = τ tD · E[S1|Ds(γs),G+t ] + (1− τ tD)γ˜s. (3)
4For simplicity, here and below we adopt the equational convention that conditioning
on an equation Yt = y is to be read as implying its disclosure.
5This equals E[Z1|Yt = γt,Gt], absent any disclosure.
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Consequently, the computation of the (unique) solution for γ˜s reduces
in the Black-Scholes setting to a simple application of the Black-Scholes
formulas, using the model parameters of §2.1; see the discussion of Theorem
1 and the equivalent equation (7) below in §3.1.1.
Remark. From a market-valuation perspective on asset prices, the value
of the future cutoff γs (as above) must be impounded in the market measure,
but this is exactly what (3) describes; so we may validly regard the risk-
neutral measure here as a summary of an underlying equilibrium market-
model, such as is described by [13].
2.4 Informal examples of censoring filters
In the simplest context of m = 1, take α1 = 1 and f1 = 1, so that Z1 = X1.
Given a filtration G generated via a censoring filter γt as above, we may term
observations of Yt relative to γt as bad news at time t when below γt, and as
good news at time t when above or at γt. Omitting mention of the time, we
refer to good and bad news relative to γ˜0, where γ˜0 := m˜0(Y0) = E0[Z1|Y0]
is the ex-ante valuation of the output process, given the initial mandatory
disclosure of Y0 at time t = 0. We use the notation
m˜t(y) = Et[Z1|Yt = y] = Et[Z1|Yt = y,Gt]
for the relevant regression function, conditional on a time-t disclosure y; here
the available information from disclosures dated before time t is indicated by
the informal subscript in the expectation operator, formalized as in §2.2 as
conditioning on Gt, so that
Et[.|...] := E[.|...,Gt].
One presumes that m˜t(.) incorporates the improving precision over time t of
the observation process. In this context one may discuss possible forms of
suppression of bad news (relative to γ˜0), starting with two polar extremes:
disclosure of all bad news (no suppression) versus suppression of all bad
news. Neither of these can be supported by equilibrium considerations, but
a natural third candidate, incorporating a suitable, downward, time-varying
risk-premium adjustment format, is capable of equilibrium support – see
Theorem 1 below.
Example (Suppression-risk adjustment). An economically justified piecewise-
deterministic approach to censoring (for the case m = 1) modifies the idea
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of naive ‘below the mean’ suppression, by anticipating how investors factor
into their risk-neutral valuation a suppression-risk premium. This leads to a
downward adjustment of the censor.
Two complementary effects underlie this premium-factor approach. To
understand this, suppose that the first disclosed observation occurs at the
stopping-time θ1 := inf{t > 0 : m˜t(Y obst ) ≥ γ˜0}. Subsequently, until a further
disclosure occurs, a time-dependent downgrade factor should be applied for
t > θ1 to the mean m˜θ1 = m˜θ1(Y
obs
θ1
) in recognition of two features: firstly, the
possibility, as time evolves, of undisclosed observations occurring below the
mean m˜θ1 (with consequent lower conditional expected output valuation),
and secondly, the improved accuracy in the forecasts of the output value Z1
(by virtue of being closer to terminal time). Consequently, the observation
cutoff γt satisfies m˜t(γt) < m˜θ1 , for t > θ1, which – paradoxically – implies
that observations leading to output valuations below the conditional mean
may, after all, be disclosed; however, these give rise to a higher valuation than
would otherwise arise from the downgraded mean. A secondary consideration
is encouragement, as time evolves, for a valuation-maximizing agent to make
a fresh disclosure; this effect must recognize that at any time t there is
a minimal expected valuation of the terminal output, conditional on the
uncertainty as to whether an observation was suppressed.
The risk-premium calculation is driven by the determinism of the Poisson
arrival rate λt, and the multiplicative nature of the three processes: output,
observation, and state. In effect the risk-premium turns out to be a deter-
ministic zero-coupon bond associated with a risky asset, valued at Et[Z1|Yt];
the bond here is a price function B of two variables, B = B(t, s), defined
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s < 1, such that B(t, t) = 1, and B(t, u)B(u, s) = B(t, s) for
0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ s < 1.
In consequence, introducing ‘disclosure times’ by reference to γt, induc-
tively starting with θ1 := inf{t > 0 : N(t) > N(t−) & Y obst ≥ γt}, the ‘risky
asset’ is priced at γ˜t = γ˜θ
−
(t) · B(θ−(t), t); here as earlier θ−(t) denotes the
last disclosure time at or below t. That is, γ˜t arises as though through a
bond-like ‘forward pricing’ mechanism. Here γ˜t = m˜t(γt), with γt the cutoff
for disclosure of Yt. Reference to consecutive down-crossing times, using such
a formula, readily yields an inductive construction of G as a subfiltration of
Ypriv.
The lesson of this example is two-fold. Firstly, the censoring filter γt
for Yt is a piecewise-deterministic Markov process in the sense of M. H.
Davis [15], because m˜t(.) is a deterministic function. Secondly, one may
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readily describe the ‘disclosure’ filtration determined by γt from Y
priv by an
inductive construction, as a subfiltration of Ypriv generated by the stopping-
times defined above, θ1, θ2, .... Indeed, this points towards an alternative
formalization of public filtrations from stopping-times.
3 Intra-period valuation: non-disclosure de-
cay
In this section a consistently generated filtration G¯ with its censoring filter
γ as defined in §2.1.7 is given and assumed to be an optimal censoring filter
in the sense of (OC). The latter is seen to be uniquely characterized as a
piecewise-deterministic Markov process in the sense of [15] (inevitably so –
see [9] and [26]) capable of generating a public filtration from {Yprivi : i ∈ I}
under which the censoring process is predictable. First, we consider the
simpler case m = 1 (leaving the general case m > 1 to §3.2), and state the
theorem asserting an explicit solution to the filtering problem (arising from
a ‘cutoff equation’ characterizing γs, for t < s < θ+, which takes the form
of a simple differential equation). The proof of the theorem is in §5.2, but
we comment after the statement that the optimal censor satisfies a Bayesian
updating rule at time s, from which our differential equation follows.
3.1 Single agent case
The situation when m = 1, and only the i-th agent is involved, follows. As
in §2.3, between public disclosure dates, we must refer not only to the censor
γt which is applied to the observation Yt, but also to the image process
γ˜t := E[Z1|Yt = γt,Gt] = E[Z1|NDt(γt),Gt].
In the Black-Scholes framework the time-t regression function γ 7→ E[Z1|Yt =
γ,Gt] is monotonic. In the single agent context, since the single observer is
the only source of any expansion of the public filtration, it is in principle
possible to work in the language of disclosure/censoring solely of the forecast
E[Z1|Yt,Gt] by reference to γ˜t, rather than of the disclosure/censoring of the
observation Yt. However, in the multiple agent setting this cannot readily
be done, since other agents may expand the public filtration and so the
connection (in equilibrium) between γ˜it and γ
i
t is more complicated. So one
14
simply has to chase both sets of variables. For technical reasons connected
with ‘re-starting’ the Wiener process (at t and at θpub− (t)), the censors need
to be re-scaled to unity at the re-starting date, hence the appearance also
of a further process γˆt in the Corollary below. (See §2.1.4 for the relevant
parameters.) In Theorem 1 reference is made to a fixed public filtration G¯
and also to general public filtrations G as in (OC) in §2.2 above; moreover, a
connection is made between the optional valuation E[Z1|G¯+t ] at the disclosure
in (i), and the predictable valuation process E[Z1|G¯t] in (ii) – cf. §2.2. Below
Φ denotes the standard normal distribution.
Theorem 1 (Decay Rule for m = 1; with only the i-th agent present).
For the model of §2, suppose that γt is a ca`dla`g optimal observation-censoring
filter, generating a disclosure filtration G¯ = {G¯+t } with associated sequence
of G¯-disclosure arrival times 0 = θpub0 < θ
pub
1 < θ
pub
2 < ... < θ
pub
ℓ < 1, of
random (finite) length ℓ ≤ N(1) at which disclosures occur.
The corresponding output-forecast process has the following properties:
(i) disclosure updating condition (‘re-initialization’)
g∗(θ
pub
− (t)) := E[Z1|G¯+t ] ≡ E[Z1|G¯t, Yt], if t = θpub− (t), (4)
or explicitly here, for t = θpub− (t),
E[Z1|G¯+t ] = E[Z1|Yt, G¯t] = kY κt ,
with
k = f 1−κ, κ = κi1 = pi/(pi + p0);
(ii) in each inter-arrival interval (i.e. between disclosure times)
supG E[Z1|Gt] = E[Z1|G¯t] = g∗((θpub− (t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
θ
νsds
)
, for θpub− (t) ≤ t < θpub+ (t),
where, on the extreme left of the display above, the left-sided-in-time supre-
mum (as in (OC)) ranges over all public filtrations G = {G+t } and, on the
extreme right: g∗ is as in (i) above, while in the valuation formula there is a
thinned decay-intensity given by
νt = λt[2Φ(σˆt/2)− 1] > 0 with σˆ2t = α2i (σ20 + σ2i )(1− t); (5)
(iii) in each inter-arrival interval, the cutoff γt for the disclosure of an ob-
servation of Yt satisfies
supG E[Z1|Gt] = kβtγtκ,
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where β = β˜
i
: [0, 1] → R (with β(1) = 1) is a decreasing deterministic
weighting function of time, identified explicitly in Lemma 2 of §5.2.
In particular, the optimal censor γt is a unique, piecewise-deterministic
Markov process.
The proof is in §5.2. The cutoff for disclosure of the output-forecast ob-
tained in Theorem 1 has the prescribed explicit form, since γ˜t = supG E[Z1|Gt]
satisfies the censoring differential equation
γ˜′t = −γ˜tνt, for θpubn−1 < t < θpubn , (6)
referred to in §1. It may be interpreted in the context of §2.3 as express-
ing the risk premium of information suppression, in a way which hints at
generalization to a broader class of models, one where regime shifts are ac-
companied by optional, so strategic, ‘protective’ activity, their exercise rates
balancing the marginal protective-option value. The following result explains
how ‘silence’ (non-disclosure) is penalized less and less as time plays out.
Corollary. In the setting of Theorem 1, the output-forecast process γ˜t
for 0 < t < 1 has the following properties:
(a) its jumps occur at the disclosure times θpubn and are upward;
(b) between jumps, the output-valuation process has the representation
γ˜t = γˆtg∗(θ
pub
n−1), where the (rescaled cutoff) deterministic function γˆt satis-
fies:
γˆ′t = −γˆtνt, for θpubn−1 < t < θpubn , with γˆ(θpubn−1) = 1;
(c) (decreasing thinning) in any interval between disclosure times the rel-
ative decay-intensity νt/λt is decreasing;
(d) between consecutive non-disclosure intervals the intra-period relative
decay intensity νt/λt decreases (to zero as t→ 1).
Proof. This is immediate – the routine proof is omitted. 
3.1.1 Game-theoretic Aspects of Theorem 1
We stress the role of game-theoretic principles underlying the proof: the
indifference principle, Bayesian updating, equilibrium, . Given information
at time 0 < t < 1, the cutoff value γs is characterized at any time s with
t < s < θ+(t) ≤ 1 by the observer’s indifference at time s, when observing
Ys, between disclosing the observed value if Ys = γs and not disclosing it; this
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is because the public valuation is identical in both circumstances. Indeed,
the valuation is identical, because in the time interval (t, s] with probability
1− (s− t)λt+o(s− t) (as s ↓ t) the agent has not observed Ys, and this event
cannot be distinguished by outsiders from the event that the agent observed
Ys, but did not disclose the observed value of Ys (since it was below γs).
This yields the indifference (equilibrium) condition as a conditional Bayes
formula:
γ˜s = E[Z1|NDs(γs),G+t ], (7)
where, as earlier γ˜s := E[Z1|Ys = γs,G+t ] and G = {G+t } here denotes the
public filtration.
The significance of (7) is that it is a special case of the Nash Equilibrium
condition (10) below; the equation (7) first appears in the static model of
Dye [16] to model rationality of partial (voluntary) disclosures, as a contrast
to the total disclosure principle (‘unravelling’) of Grossman and Hart [20].
3.1.2 Cutoffs and the Black-Scholes formula
A consequence of (7) (and of (10) below) and is a Black-Scholes formula
for the cutoff γ = γ˜s applied to the forecast (rather than the observation).
The calculation goes back at least to [22] (cf. [18]), where (7) in the present
context reduces to:
µF − γ =
q
1− qHF (γ), where (8)
HF (γ) = E[(γ − F )+] =
∫
(γ − x)+dQ(F ≤ x) =
∫
x≤γ
Q(F ≤ x)dx,
(cf. Prop. 1 and §5.1). Here F denotes the random variable E[Z1|Ys,G+t ],
with mean µF (conditional at time t+), q = (s− t)λt is the probability with
which an observation occurs (independently of F ) by time s, and HF (γ) is
the ‘lower first partial moment below a target γ’, well-known in risk man-
agement6, briefly termed (in view of its key role) the hemi-mean function.
The log-normal F above, prompts a standardization in terms of the pa-
rameters λ, σ for the solution γ = γLN(λ, σ) of
1− γ = λHLN(γ; σ). (9)
6See for example McNeil, Frey and Embrechts [29], Section 2.2.4.
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The behaviour of the solution derives from the properties of the Black-Scholes
put formula as a function of its strike – equivalently of the corresponding call
formula as a function of its underlying asset price (Black-Scholes ‘put-call
symmetry’, cf. [BarNS, § 11.4], [BjeS], [CarL] – for background see [Teh]).
For strike γ and expiry at time 1, conditional on an initial asset valuation of
γ˜t at time t < 1, the formula reads
HLN(γ) = γΦ
(
log(γ/γ˜t) +
1
2
σ2(1− t)
σ
√
1− t
)
− γtΦ
(
log(γ/γ˜t)− 12σ2(1− t)
σ
√
1− t
)
,
with Φ the standard normal distribution as above.
Consequently, at any time t between consecutive voluntary disclosures,
setting the strike above to γ = γ˜s yields in the limit as s ↓ t (with γ˜s → γ˜t) an
at-the-money limiting forward-start call formula; this at-the-money option-
value simplifies to γ˜t2Φ(σt/2), as in (5). We hope to return to this aspect
elsewhere.
3.1.3 Other Comments
The decay-intensity rate νt is composed of two factors both having economic
significance. First, the Poisson intensity λmeasures the instantaneous oppor-
tunity cost of the arrival of an observation of information about the output
valuation, and impounds the chance both for a valuation upgrade (through
a good observation), and for the suppression of poor observation value. Sec-
ondly, the intensity λ is thinned by the probability of suppressing poor val-
uation, the effect of a ‘protective put’. Over time the protective put loses
value and tends to zero as the precision improves (i.e. the volatility goes to
zero).
To see the details of the formula intuitively, recall that, as above, it
is assumed that the observer chooses to achieve the maximum valuation,
and thus makes a voluntary disclosure according to the rule: find the cutoff
function t 7→ γt such that for t = θobsn :
(i) disclose credibly the value of Y , when Yt ≥ γt, or, equivalently, the public
output-forecast Zestt := Et[Z1|Y (θobsn )]; and
(ii) make no disclosure, when Yt < γt.
Replacing Yt by Z
est
t := E[Z1|G+t ], one may restate the Y -cutoff problem (of
choosing γt) in isomorphic terms as a cutoff problem for Z
est
t (i.e. of choos-
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ing its corresponding cutoff γ˜t), assuming the regression function m˜t(y) :=
Et[Z1|Yt = y] is monotonic.
3.2 Multiple agent case
We now consider the general case m > 1. Here the starting point is a system
of equations that relates the values {γit : i = 1, ..., m} to each other by
reference to a general Bayesian updating rule having the form of a system of
(subgame) Nash equilibrium conditions for i = 1, ..., m:
E[Z i1|(∀j)NDjt (γjt ),Gt] = E[Z i1|(∀j 6= i)NDjt (γjt )NDjt (γjt ), Yi = γit,Gt], (10)
with NDjt (γ) being the non-disclosure event (of time t). The intended mean-
ing is that, contingent on the information available prior to time t, in the
event that all of the agents make no disclosures (for lack of observations, or
because observations lie at or below their respective filtering-censor value)
and the i-th agent’s observation is identical to the value of the respective
filtering-censor γit, the corresponding output estimate value (i.e. Z
i
1 in ex-
pectation) is the same whether, or not, that agent chooses to disclose the
observation. (Recall the equational convention in the footnote of §2.3.) The
conditions (10) generalize (3) of §2.3 – see also §3.1.1 above.
Note that NDjt (γ) is complementary to Dt(γ), as earlier defined in §2.3
(though here in respect of the j-th agent).
In the inter-arrival period the absence of any disclosure from all of the
m observation processes will influence the decay rate of each of the optimal
observation filtering censors differentially, i.e. the filtering equation is bound
to express the interdependence flowing from the Nash Equilibrium conditions
(10) above. To express the explicit form, we need a number of parameters
derived from the volatilities of §2.1. Using an abbreviating tilde notation,
put
σ20i := σ
2
0 + σ
2
i and σ˜
2
0i(t) := (1− t)σ20i,
and analogously:
p˜i(t) : = 1/[(1− t)σ2i ], p˜(t) :=
∑m
i=0
p˜i(t), κ˜i(t) := p˜i(t)/p˜(t) ≡ κi,
κ˜−i(t) : = p˜i(t)/(p˜(t)− p˜i(t)) ≡ κ−i := pi/(p− pi).
Of particular significance is the function ρ˜i(t), which denotes for given t the
(conditional) partial covariance (cf. [11]) of the i-th component of (..., σ0W˜
0
1−t+
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σiW˜
i
1−t, ...) on the remaining components, where W˜ denotes the Wiener pro-
cess W re-started at time t.
We may now state the general theorem; use of the subscript ‘hyp’ here
is explained in the discussion below. The function β˜
i
m corresponds to β˜
i
in
Theorem 1, and is derived in Lemma 2m of §5.4. Below γ˜it = supG E[Z
i
1|Gt],
is as earlier, but yit replaces γit to allow y˜it to have another meaning, corre-
sponding to a rescaling of Y is to Y˜
i
s in the proof. The notation here of G¯ and
G is similar to that in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1m (Filtering rule during continued non-disclosure:
m ≥ 1). For the model of §2, suppose yt = (..., yit, ...) is a ca`dla`g optimal
censoring filter generating a disclosure filtration G¯ with associated sequence
of G¯-disclosure-arrival times 0 = θpub0 < θ
pub
1 < θ
pub
2 < ... < θ
pub
ℓ < 1 of
random (finite) length ℓ ≤∑mi=1N i(1), at which disclosure events occur.
Then, for 0 ≤ n ≤ ℓ, the corresponding output-forecast process has the
following properties:
(i) disclosure updating condition (the i-th agent’s ‘re-initialization’)
gi∗(t) := E[Z
i
1|G+t ] = E[Z i1|{Y jt : j ∈ Jt}], if t = θpub− (t); (11)
(ii) in each inter-arrival interval θ = θpub− (t) ≤ t < θpub+ (t)
supG E[Z
i
1|Gt] = E[Z i1|G¯t] = kimβ˜
i
mg
i
∗(θ) exp
(
−
∫ t
θ
νagg(s)ds
)
,
where on the extreme left, the left-sided-in-time supremum ranges over public
filtrations G = {G+t } and, on the extreme-right, the correlation-aggregated
decay-intensity vagg is
νagg(t) :=
∑
j
κj
κ−j
(
1 +
∑
h
αh
αj
κh
κ0
)
νjhyp(t),
and
νihyp(t) := Φ
(
1
2
αiκiσ˜0i
√
1− ρ˜2i
)
λ˜i,
and β˜
i
m = β˜
i
indiv · β˜agg with
β˜
i
indiv := µ(αi, (1− κ0)σ˜20)µ(κi1, (1− κ0)σ˜2i ), and β˜agg =
∏
j
µ(κj , σ˜
2
0j);
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(iii) in each inter-arrival interval between disclosure event times, the disclo-
sure censor yit of the i-th agent is given for θ = θ
pub
n−1 ≤ t < θpubn by:
1
αi
log yit = −
1
αiκ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds
− 1
κ0
(
κ1
α1κ−1
∫ t
θ
ν1hyp(s)ds+
κ2
α2κ−2
∫ t
θ
ν2hyp(s)ds+ ...
)
.
In particular, the optimal censor yt is a unique, piecewise-deterministic
Markov process.
Note that for m = 1 this reduces to Theorem 1. The proof is in §5.3 and
depends (as does Theorem 1) on the factorization of the process M = M i
(with σM for σMi) for fixed t in the self-evident form
M1 = M0 exp(σMW1 − 1
2
σ2M) =Mt exp(σMW˜1−t −
1
2
σ2M(1− t)),
where W˜ i is W i re-started at time t.
Discussion of Theorem 1m. This result builds on Theorem 1, hence bears
appropriate similarities (e.g. updating at disclosure dates), and relies on
the conditional Bayes formula (7), so we now comment only on what is most
significantly different here form > 1, namely the need to disaggregate the co-
dependance. To define the observation cutoffs of the m observing agents, one
first constructs m corresponding agents, termed hypothetical agents, each of
whom faces a suppressed-observation problem of the kind considered in The-
orem 1, but in isolation. This introduces two features: firstly, an amended-
mean factor L−i(t), multiplying the current conditional mean of the observa-
tion process (defined in Theorem M of §5.3 and reflecting incremental effects
of a single agent, that are based only on loading and precision factors) – and,
secondly, the partial covariance ρ˜i, arising from the use of the Schur com-
plement (see [5, Note 4.27, p.120], cf. [24, Ch. 27], [25, §§46.26-28]). The
corresponding hypothetical observation-cutoffs are later aggregated to yield
observation cutoffs of the original m-agent problem. From these observation
cutoffs a current forecast γ˜it of the i-th output Z
i
1 is derived. Recall that
in Theorem 1 the formula for γ˜t required the use of a rescaled function γˆt
(with unit value at t = θ, the latest disclosure date). Likewise in Theorem
1m we also see a function γˆ
i
t used in similar fashion to construct γ˜
i
t; here the
size-constant kim corresponds to f
i, and reflects relative output magnitude,
just as κi reflects relative precision.
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4 Application: Market valuation with cen-
sored voluntary disclosures
The differential equations of Theorem 1m can be used to derive comparative
statics of price formation in an asset market, in which investors expect vol-
untary disclosures (with positive probability) at all times between the two
fixed mandatory disclosure dates. These comparative statics are concerned
with intervals of time during which the agents are known to be privately and
intermittently observing noisy signals of the asset values, arising from the
common effect. The interpretation of §2.3 extends here to
Sit := E[E[Z
i
1|G+1 ]|G+t ]
as an asset-price process (with expectations under Q as the market’s risk-
neutral valuation measure).
Agent i is endowed intermittently with private information about the
evolution of the i-th asset price via the martingale Y it , and can voluntarily
disclose information about the asset to the market. At times t strictly be-
tween consecutive public disclosure arrival times, conditioning on G+t or on
Gt yields identical forecasts of the time-1 valuation E[Z i1|G+1 ], so correspond-
ingly the asset price Sit is identical with γ˜
i
t = E[E[Z
i
1|G+1 ]|Gt], where γ˜it is the
unique valuation-cutoff given by Theorem 1m. Furthermore, §2.3 describes
disclosure behaviour as being incentivized so that the asset price gives the
current stock-holders (investors) asset valuations that are maximal given the
available public information.
The effects on price formation may thus be studied by recourse to the
observation cutoffs employed by the respective agents in terms of the param-
eters of the model: the precisions pi, the loading factors αi, and the private
observation arrival intensities λi. It is interesting to note the predictions
about suppression. Since the correlation between firms and the environment
factor are positive, the formulas established above imply that a good-news
bandwagon effect holds: ceteris paribus, agents all choose a higher cutoff
(relative to the single agent case m = 1), reducing the probability that they
will release private observations. Additionally, there is an intuitively clear
estimator-quality effect, which leads to agents being partitioned into below-
and above-‘average precision’ (over the m-agent population), as in the theo-
rems that follow. Those with below-average precision are shown to adopt a
lower cutoff (relative to the single agent case), and ceteris paribus increase
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the probability that they will release private observations, with the reverse
holding for the above-average.
Bandwagon Theorem. In any intra-period the presence of correlation
increases the precision parameter of the cutoff and hence raises the cutoff:
γˆLN(λ˜i, σ˜0i) < γˆLN(λ˜i, κiσ˜0i) < γˆLN
(
λ˜i, κiσ˜0i
√
1− ρ˜2i
)
,
where γˆLN(λ, σ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
(1− y) = λHLN(y, σ),
and represents the normalized cutoff in the single agent case, as in (9).
Proof. This is immediate from the static model of [18, §6].
When the correlation is positive, there is also a counter-vailing precision
effect on the related hypothetical agent’s cutoff, arising from the amended
mean factor L−i (see the discussion of Theorem 1m above), when the actual
agent has below-average precision, as defined below.
Estimator-Quality Theorem. Suppose that m ≥ 2 and αi > 0 for all i.
The amended mean L−i(t) of the hypothetical firm i increases with pi and
exp
(
−αi(1− t)
2(p− pi)
)
< L−i(t) < exp
(
αi
(
1 + αi−1
n−1
)
(1− t)
2pav,−i
)
,
where pav,−i : =
p− pi
n− 1 + αi .
In particular, if the loading index is identical for all firms, then
L−i(t) < L−j(t) iff pi < pj .
Otherwise, if 0 < αi < αj and pi < pj , then also L−i(t) < L−j(t).
The amended mean is a strict deflator, i.e. L−i(t) < 1, iff pi is below the
loading-adjusted competitor average, i.e.
pi <
p
n− 1 + αi := pav,-i
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so that for αi = 1 one has pav,-i = p/n.
Proof. This again is immediate from the static model of [18, §6].
Thus low-precision managers are more likely to make a disclosure, but
by definition the disclosure will be less precise. Hence, in terms of giving it
weighting in the updating rules, investors will give less weight to disclosure
of bad news by such imprecise managers.
5 Proofs
We begin in §5.1 with a Proof of Proposition 1 and use it in §5.2 to prove
Theorem 1, but only after we have prepared the ground with the calculations
in two lemmas. In §5.3 we prove Theorem 1m; the argument will require
generalizations of the lemmas of §5.2, and these are relegated to §5.4.
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the notation of §2, we have
γ˜s =
Q(N(s) = N(t)) · E[Z1|G+t ] +Q(N(t) < N(s)) ·
∫
z1≤γ˜s
z1dQ(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ z1|G+t )
Q(N(s) = N(t)) +Q(N(t) < N(s))Q(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ γ˜s|G+t )
=
(1− (s− t)λt) · γ˜t + (s− t)λt ·
∫
z1≤γ˜s
z1dQ(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ z1|G+t )
(1− (s− t)λt) + (s− t)λtQ(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ γ˜s|G+t )
.
Putting qts = (s − t)λt, expressing Q as
∫
dQ, cross-multiplying and re-
arranging
(1− qts)(γ˜t − γ˜s) + o(s− t) = qts
∫
z1≤γ˜s
(z1 − γ˜s)dQ(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ z1|G+t )
= −qts
∫
z1≤γ˜s
Q(E[Z1|Ys,G+t ] ≤ z1|G+t )dz1,
where the last line is from integrating by parts. 
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1.
Idea of the proof. This rests on two observations. The first is that,
since the regression function m˜t(γ) := E[Z1|Yt = γ,Gt] is explicit (Lemma 1
below – but here we omit the agent’s index) and monotone, the censoring
behaviour dictated by a cutoff function γt for the disclosure of Yt may be
equivalently expressed as a censoring function γ˜t for the disclosure of the
valuation process Z˜t := m˜t(Yt), where
γ˜t = m˜t(γt).
The second – the nub of the proof (from Prop. 1) – is that γ˜t may be char-
acterized by an equation expressing the agent’s indifference between non-
disclosure and disclosure of Z˜t when Z˜t = γ˜t. Such an equation gives γ˜t only
implicitly ; however, a variational analysis of the equation explicitly deter-
mines γ˜t via an easy differential equation. Inverting the regression yields γt
in explicit form as
γt = m˜
−1
t (γ˜t).
In the variational analysis above, the agent treats Z˜t as a noisy signal of Z1
on the grounds that Et[Z1|Z˜t,Gt] = Et[Z1|Yt,Gt] = Z˜t. This leads to a two-
period analysis, in which the process value Z1 is viewed, from the standpoint
of information of time t, as a random variable, and permits exploitation of
known results from two-period analyses.
Although m = 1 below, having in mind the notational needs of §5.3,
where m > 1, it is helpful to employ here a general index i for the single agent
of interest (rather than to specialize i = 1), thereby anticipating the later
general case. Also, as m = 1, the index i can be omitted at will, whenever
convenient. We begin with some auxiliary results stated as Lemmas 1 and
2, which will require the notation
µ(κ, σ2) := e
1
2
κ(κ−1)σ2.
The exponent 1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2 in µ above corresponds to the second-order term
of Itoˆ’s Lemma for the power function t → tκ, a recurring feature of the
regression formulas (from Lemma 1). For other parameters refer to §2.1.
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Recall the tilde notation of §3.2 that, for any constant σ, we write σ˜2 for
the function σ˜2(t) := σ2 · (1 − t), corresponding to re-starting the model at
time t. In particular, with σ¯20i := α
2
iσ
2
0 + (αiσi)
2, we write
σ˜2i (t) = σ
2
i (1− t) and σ¯20i(t) = α2i [σ20 + σ2i ](1− t) = α2i σ˜20i.
For convenience, we may denote X also by M0. For the Wiener processes
W i, recall the corresponding Wiener process re-started at time t
W˜ is := W
i
t+s −W it .
(So W˜0 = 0.) Omitting suffices and writing σW for σ
M
i ,
Mt+s = Mt exp(σW W˜s − 1
2
σ2W s). (12)
We need two lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Valuation of Z1 given observation Y1 for m = 1). Put
κ = κi1 = pi/(p0 + pi).
Then
E[Z1|Y i1 = y,G1] = kyκ for k = ki1 = (f i)1−κ.
Proof. We cite and apply a formula from [18, Prop. 10.3, with n = 1].
To distinguish notational contexts, we use overbars on letters when citing
formulas from there. The noisy observation there, T¯ , of a random (state)
variable X¯ takes the form T¯ = X¯Y¯ , where X¯ and Y¯ are independent ran-
dom variables, with their log-normal distributions having underlying normal
precision parameters p¯X , p¯Y respectively. The required formula is
E[X¯α|T¯ ] = K¯α(T¯ )ακ,
where κ = p¯Y /p¯ for p¯ = p¯X + p¯Y and
K¯α = exp
(
α + α(α− 1)
2p¯
)
.
We will take X¯ = X1 and Y¯ = M
1/α
1 , with M = M
i and α = αi below.
We first compute the corresponding constants p¯X , p¯Y and K¯α. Substituting
s = 1− t = ∆t in (12) above, gives
X1 = X1−∆t exp(σ0W˜
0
∆t −
σ20
2
∆t),
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and
M
1/α
1 =M
1/α
1−∆t exp(
σMi
αi
W˜ i∆t −
(σMi )
2
2αi
∆t) = M
1/α
1−∆t exp(σiW˜
i
∆t −
1
2
αiσ
2
i∆t).
Conditional on the realizations ofX1−∆t andM
1/α
1−∆t, X¯ and Y¯ have respective
underlying conditional variances of σ20∆t and σ
2
i∆t, as σ
M
i /αi = σi. So the
corresponding regression coefficient κ for X¯ on Y¯ is
α2/(αiσi)
2
α2/(αiσi)2 + 1/σ20
=
1/(σi)
2
1/(σi)2 + 1/σ20
=
pi
pi + p0
= κi1,
having cancelled ∆t > 0 from numerator and denominator; this remains
constant as ∆t varies, and so also in the passage as ∆t→ 0. Also
1/p¯ =
∆t
1/σ2i + 1/σ
2
0
,
so K¯α = K¯α(∆t)→ 1 as ∆t→ 0. Finally, since Y it = Z itM it = f iXαit M it ,
T¯ = (Y i1/f
i)1/α = X1M
1/α
1 = X¯Y¯ ,
and so, conditioning on Y i1 = y, and setting k = f
1−κ,
E[Z i1|T¯ ] = E[f iXα1 |T¯ ] = f i(T¯ )ακ = f i((Y i1 /f i)1/α)ακ = f i(y/f i)κ = kyκ. 
Below the deterministic functions β˜
i
factor into β˜
i
indiv, β˜agg to anticipate
m-fold versions which ‘separate’ individual and aggregate effects of agents.
Lemma 2 (Time-t conditional law of the valuation of Z1, given ob-
servation Yt – for m = 1). Conditional on Y
i
t = y, the time-t distribution
of the time-1 valuation E[Z1|Y1,G1] is that of
kβ˜
i
yκZˆt := kβ˜
i
indivβ˜aggy
κZˆt,
with k = ki1 as in Lemma 1, and:
(i)
κ = κi1, β˜
i
indiv := (µ
0
t (αi)µ
i
t)
κ, β˜agg := µ(κ, α
2
i σ˜
2
0i),
µit : = µ(αi, α
2
i σ˜
2
i ) and µ
0
t (αi) = µ(αi, σ˜
2
0);
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(ii) Zˆt log-normal, its underlying mean-zero normal of variance σˆ
2
t = κα
2
i σ˜
2
0i.
In particular, this time-t distribution has mean given by
E[Z1|Y it = y,Gt] = kβ˜
i
indivβ˜aggy
κ.
Proof. From (12) with M = M i and any δ > 0
M δt+s = M
δ
0 exp(δσMWt+s −
1
2
δσ2M(t+ s)) = M
δ
t exp(δσMW˜s −
1
2
δσ2Ms).
So, for s = 1− t,
M δ1 = µt(δ)M
δ
t exp(δσMW˜1−t −
1
2
δ2σ2M(1− t)),
where the last term has unit-mean and
µt(δ) = µ(δ, σ˜
2
M) = µ(δ, α
2
i σ˜
2
i ).
In particular, for δ = κ = κi1 (i.e. for κ as in Lemma 1) and M = M
i,
Mκ1 = µ
i
t ·Mκt · exp(καiσiW it (1− t)−
1
2
κ2α2iσ
2
i (1− t)),
where µit = µ(κ, α
2
i σ˜
2
i ) = µ(κ
i
1, α
2
i σ˜
2
i ); likewise, for M = X and δ = αi,
Z i1 = f
iXαi1 = µ
0
t (αi) · Z it · exp(αiσ0W˜ 01−t −
1
2
α2iσ
2
0(1− t)),
where µ0t (αi) = µ(αi, σ˜
2
0). Combining, as Y
i
t = Z
i
tM
i
t , for any δ > 0 :
(Y i1 )
δ = (µ0t (αi)µ
i
t·Z itM it )δ·exp(αiδσ0W˜ 01−t−δα2iσ20(1−t)/2)·exp(δαiσiW˜ i1−t−δα2iσ2i (1−t)/2).
But
δ[αiσ0W˜
0
1−t + αiσiW˜
i
1−t] = δαi[σ0W
0
t (1− t) + σiW˜ i1−t]
has variance δ2α2i σ˜
2
0i, where σ˜
2
0i = [σ
2
0 + σ
2
i ](1− t). So taking
Zˆt(δ) := exp
(
δαi[σ0W˜
0
1−t + σiW˜
i
1−t]−
1
2
δ2α2i σ˜
2
0i
)
,
which has unit-mean and variance δ2α2i σ˜
2
0i, gives
(Y i1 )
δ = (µ0tµ
i
t · Y it )δµ(δ, α2i σ˜20i)Zˆt(δ). (13)
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In particular, condition on Y it = y, take δ = κ above, and set
Zˆt := Zˆt(κ);
then, by (13) and with k as in Lemma 1 above, the conditional time-t distri-
bution of E[Z1|Y1,G1] is that of the variable Zestt given by
Zestt := k(Y
i
1 )
κ = k(µ0tµ
i
t · y)κµ(κ, α2i σ˜20i)Zˆt. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Below we suppress reference to the unique agent i.
We condition on the event θpub− (t) ≤ t < s < θpub+ (t), i.e. that there has been
no subsequent disclosure in (t, s]. Denote by γt the ca`dla`g censor assumed
in Theorem 1. For t ≤ u ≤ s, let NDu(γ) denote the event that, at time u,
either ∆N(u) = 0 or the agent observes Ys to be below γ, and let γ˜u be the
time-u evaluation of the random variable E[Z1|Y1,G1]; then
γ˜u = E[Z1|NDu(γu),G+t ].
As in §2.3, by the Indifference Principle (cf. [18, §11 (Appendix 8)]), the
unique cutoff value γu for Yu and the time-u evaluation γ˜u of E[Z1|Y1,G1] are
related by
γ˜u = E[Z1|NDu(γu),G+t ] = E[Z1|Yu = γu,G+t ] = kβ˜uγκu,
with β˜u = β˜
i
u denoting β˜
i
evaluated at u, as in Lemma 2 above, so that
γ˜u = kβ˜uγ
κ
u, or log γ˜u = κ log γu + log kβ˜u.
For u > t, put γˆu := γ˜u/γ˜t (so that γˆt = 1), thus rescaling E[E[Z1|Y1,G1]|G+t ],
the time-t valuation of E[Z1|Y1,G1], to unity; we now work as though γ˜t = 1.
Let the corresponding time-u valuation be the random variable Zˆu of Lemma
2. The underlying zero-mean normal random variable of the Lemma has
variance σˆ2u := κ
2σ˜20i(u). In the notation of Lemma 2, with qts := (s − t)λt
the formula of Prop. 1 gives
(1− qts)(1− γˆs) + o(s− t) = qts
∫
zs≤γˆs
(zs − γˆs)dQ(Zˆs ≤ zs|Gt, γ˜t = 1)
= −qts
∫
zs≤γˆs
Q(Zˆs ≤ zs|Gt, γ˜t = 1)dzs.
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Dividing by −qts and rearranging the differential term, by the Black-Scholes
formula
−(1− qts) 1
λt
γˆs − 1
(s− t) =
∫
zs≤γ˜s
Q(Zˆs ≤ zs|Gt, γ˜t = 1)dzs
= γˆsΦ
(
log(γˆs) +
1
2
σˆ2(1− t)
σˆ
√
1− t
)
− Φ
(
log(γˆs)− 12 σˆ2(1− t)
σˆ
√
1− t
)
,
up to o(s− t)/[(s− t)λt]. Rearranging once more and, using the abbreviating
notation σˆ2t for the variance,
(1−qts) 1
λt
γˆs − 1
(s− t) = −γˆsΦ
(
log(γˆs) +
1
2
σˆ2t
σˆt
)
+Φ
(
log(γˆs)− 12 σˆ2t
σˆt
)
+
o(s− t)
(s− t)λt .
Because yu is ca`dla`g, so also are γ˜u and γˆu; so the terms on the right have a
limit as s ↓ t. As qts → 0, the function γˆ(u) is seen to be right-differentiable
at t, and, since Φ(−u) = 1− Φ(u),
1
λt
γˆ′(t) = −[2Φ(σˆt/2)− 1], (14)
or equivalently, recalling that σˆ2t = α
2
i (σ
2
0 + σ
2
i )(1− t),
γ˜′(t)
γ˜(t)
= −λt[2Φ(σˆt/2)− 1]. (15)
Now unfixing t, we permit t to vary over an interval during which there is
no disclosure. Solving the differential equation, by integrating from the last
disclosure date θ−(t) ≥ 0 to the date t, and conditioning on t being prior to
the next disclosure θ+(t), gives the following:
log (γ˜(t)/γ˜(θ−(t))) = −
∫ t
θ
−
λu[2Φ(σˆu/2)− 1]du,
γ˜(t) = γ˜(θ−(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
θ
−
λu[2Φ(σˆu/2)− 1]du
)
.
Note that as σˆu ≥ 0, the factor [2Φ(σˆs/2)− 1] is non-negative.
So the conditional time-t evaluation of E1[Z1|Y1] := E[Z1|Y1,G1] is given
explicitly by
γ˜t = E[E1[Z1|Y1]|NDt(γt),Gt] = E[Z1|NDt(γt),Gt] = γˆ(t)E[Z1|Yθ,Gθ],
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for θ = θ−(t) (and with t unfixed), where now
γˆ(t) := exp
(
−
∫ t
θ
−
λu[2Φ(σˆu/2)− 1]du
)
,
by abuse of notation, as this function satisfies (14), but with γˆ(θ−(t)) = 1.
To obtain the explicit form, apply Lemma 2 with θ = θ− to give
E[Z1|Yθ,Gθ] = kβθY κθ ,
where, re-instating the index i,
κ = κi1 = pi/(p0 + pi), k = k
i
1 = f
1−κi
1
i , βt = (µ
0
tµ
i
t)
κi
1µ(κi1, σ˜
2
0i),
with µit := µ(αi, α
2
i σ˜
2
i ) and µ
0
t (αi) = µ(αi, σ˜
2
0). Finally, the cutoff for Y
i
u is
given explicitly by Lemma 2 as
γiu = (γ˜
i
u/(k
i
1β
i
u))
1/κi
1 .
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1m
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1m, which is like Theorem 1,
but more intricate in its details on account of an application of a result from
[18, Th. 14.2 (Appendix 7)], Theorem M below. Appropriate substitutions
(of the parameter values used here for the parameter values used there) are
needed; justification of these is routine, but cumbersome, so shown as a
tabulation in this the proposed the arXiv version only; their basis comes
from some calculations deferred to §5.4. In view of similarities, as well as
differences of context, between the present and the source paper, we follow
the convention of §5.2 of overbarring variables cited from [18, Th. 14.2
(Appendix 7)]. This allows Theorem M to be read as applicable in either of
the two contexts according as parameters are over-barred, or not. We note
that λ¯ = 1/λ – the λ variables of the two papers are reciprocals, by Prop. 1.
Theorem M (Multi-firm Cutoff Equations, [18, Th. 14.2 (Appendix
7)]). In the setting of this section, after rescaling so that Y it = 1, with
observations Y is of time s > t replaced by their re-scaled versions Y˜
i
s , the
simultaneous conditional Bayes equations determining the cutoffs for Y˜ is may
be reduced to a non-singular system of linear equations relating the log-cutoffs
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to the hypothetical cutoffs gi defined below. Furthermore, the unique solution
for the disclosure cutoff y˜i for the observation of Y˜ is is given by
log y˜i =
log gi
αiκ−i
+
1
κ0
(
κ1
α1κ−1
log g1 +
κ2
α2κ−2
log g2 + ... +
κm
αmκ−m
log gm
)
,
(16)
where
gi = gi(s) = γˆL N(λ˜i, αiκiσ˜0i
√
1− ρ˜2i )L−i with λ˜i = λi(s), the N is intensity,
L−i = L−i(s) = exp
(
αi(m− 1) + αi(αi − 1)
2(p˜− p˜i)
)
exp
(
−mαi + αi(αi − 1)
2p˜
)
,
(the ‘amended mean’ – an adjustment coefficient for the cutoff),
and where:
γˆLN(λ, σ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
(1− y) = λHLN(y, σ), (17)
κi = p¯i/p¯ (the standard regression coefficient),
κ−i = p¯i/(p¯ − p¯i) (removing agent-i’s contribution from the aggregate preci-
sion),
1 − ρ˜2i is the partial covariance of w˜i on the remaining variates w˜j, with
w˜j(t) := σ0W˜
0
1−t + σiW˜
j
1−t.
Proof strategy. The results of [18] concern a two-period model in which
there is an initial time (taken here to be a fixed time t < 1), a second ‘interim
date’ (taken here to be a time s with t < s < 1), and a terminal date
of 1, as here. Furthermore, that model refers to random variables, whose
realizations describe values which are to be disclosed at the (mandatory)
disclosure terminal date. Agent i in [18] has at the interim date (time s,
here) a positive probability of receiving a private, noisy observation T¯i = X¯Y¯i
with X¯ the state random variable and Y¯i the noise; the random variables are
independent, log-normally distributed, with underlying normals having zero-
mean and precisions p¯0 and p¯i, respectively. The probability of observation
is described by the odds λ¯i. The agent seeks to maximize the interim-date
expected value of Z i := fiX¯
αi , by selecting a unique cutoff γ¯i for T¯i. The
model may be notationally summarized asMn¯(Z|T¯1, ..., T¯n¯; λ¯1, ..., λ¯n¯), with n¯
the number of agents. The value of γ¯i is unique and is described in Theorem
M by suitable aggregation of cutoffs γˆi obtained by reference to n¯ independent
32
simpler single-agent models M1(Zhyp-i1 |T¯ hypi ; λ¯i), the solitary agents i being
the hypothetical agents (corresponding to the original agents i); the original
correlations between agents are removed, by way of the Schur complement –
specifically via a partial covariance ρ¯i (measuring covariance of the i-th agent
on the others, as described in the theorem; see [5, Note 4.27, p.120], cf. [24,
Ch. 27], [25, §§46.26-28]). Theorem M prescribes γˆi for the common-sized
(cf. §2.1.2) hypothetical observation variate:
T¯ hypi := (T¯i)
αiκ¯i
√
1−ρ¯2
i = (X¯Y¯i)
αiκ¯i
√
1−ρ¯2
i ,
i.e. with precision parameter altered by the factor αiκ¯i
√
1− ρ¯2i .
This result comes from employing, in the spirit of §5.2, a monotone single-
variable conditional regression function, e.g. m˜(t1|γ¯2, γ¯3, ...) := E[Z i1|T¯1 =
t1&(∀j > 1)(T¯j = γ¯j)], to find the cutoff for the corresponding conditional
valuation
Z˜1 := E[Z
i
1|T¯1 = t1&(∀j > 1)(T¯j = γ¯j)].
The characterizing equation reduces to an equivalent unconditional one,
where all but one of the noisy observations is absent.
The proof in outline runs like this.
(i) Apply Theorem M. To achieve the format T¯i = X¯Y¯i replace Y
i
t by
Y˜ it = (Y
i)1/αi.
Fix times t, s with t < s; assume non-disclosure throughout (t, s]; construct
random variables, which at time s describe outcomes of time 1; for these
compute appropriate statistics; pass to the hypothetical processes. At this
point the latter are defined implicitly only.
Much of this part of the proof is deferred to §5.4 Lemmas 1m and 2m
(versions of Lemmas 1 and 2 for general m), where we compute the constants
kim and deterministic functions β
i
t such that for κi = κ
i
m
E[Z i1|Yt = yt,Gt] = kimβityκ11t ...yκimt.
(ii) Obtain explicit formulas for yhyps by variational analysis: compute the
dynamics of the valuation cutoffs γit of the ‘estimators’ Zˆ
hyp i
t = E[Z
hyp-i
1 |Gt]
from the dynamics of the hypothetical processes. Being hypothetical models
with state and observation processes identical, these observation and valua-
tion cutoffs are the same as yhyps .
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(iii) First Inversion: substitute yhyps into Theorem M to obtain cutoffs
γ¯is = y˜
i
s for Y˜
i
s from the vector of observation cutoffs y
hyp
s of the hypothetical
agents j.
(iii) Second Inversion: Reverse-engineer from the y˜is cutoff dynamics the
dynamics for Y it = (Y˜
i
t )
αi, using log yis = αi log y˜
i
s.
Substitutions justified. Taking fˆ i = (f i)1/αi and M˜ is := (M
i
s)
1/αi ,
Y˜ it := (Y
i
t )
1/αi = (Z itM
i
t )
1/αi = fˆ i (Xt) M˜
i
t ,
(cf. Lemmas 1 and 2 of §5.2), so Y˜ i1 = fˆ
iX1M˜
i
1.
Since M˜ it has underlying Wiener volatility σ
M
i /αi = σi, we compute pa-
rameter values as tabulated below.
There (barred) Here
σ¯0 σ˜0 := σ˜0(t) = σ0(1− t)1/2
σ¯i σ˜i i = 0, 1, ..., m,
σ¯20i := σ¯
2
0 + σ¯
2
i σ˜
2
0i = σ˜
2
0 + (σ˜i)
2
p¯i, p¯
pi = 1/σ
2
i , p =
∑m
i=0 1/σ
2
i
p˜i = pi(1− t), p˜ = p(1− t)
κ¯i = p¯i/p¯ κ˜i = p˜i/p˜ = pi/p = κi (constants)
Ti = e
σ¯0iw¯i−
1
2
σ¯2
0i Y˜ i1 = Y˜
i
t
(
eσ0W˜
0
t (1−t)−
1
2
σ˜2
0
)(
eσiW˜
i
t (1−t)−
1
2
σ˜i2
)
w¯i w˜i := σ0W˜
0
t (1− t) + σiW˜ it (1− t)
ρ¯i ρ˜i
Xαi Z i1 := f
i ·Xαi1
σ¯hyp,i σhyp,i := αiκiσ˜0i
√
1− ρ˜2i
Proof of Theorem 1m.We proceed stepwise.
1. (Hypothetical cutoff dynamics). We consider s, t with θ = θpub− ≤
t < s < θpub+ ≤ 1.We apply Theorem M above (with t as the ex-ante date and
s the interim date) to an agent i. Theorem M sets the observation cutoffs for
Y˜ iu in terms of the cutoffs y
hyp
i (u) of a correspondingly defined ‘hypothetical’
observer, the latter being defined implicitly via equation (17). As in §5.2,
we perform a variational analysis to derive explicitly the cutoffs zˆi(u) of the
corresponding hypothetical observation.
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Since Theorem M applies to variables that have been common-sized to
unity at the ex-ante date t, put Gi(u) = zˆi(u)/zˆi(t), so that Gi(t) = 1 for each
i. Then, corresponding to a common-sized process, there is a hypothetical
process (g-process) with adjusted value Gi(u)L−i(u) as at time u, and with
a hypothetical volatility per unit time of
σ˜hyp,i = σhyp,i(u) := αiκiσ˜0i
√
1− ρ˜2i .
The solitary hypothetical process, observed intermittently by agent i, is now
subjected to the variational analysis of §5.2, as follows.
As in §3, by the Indifference Principle of [18, §15 (Appendix 8)] applied
at time t, the unique cutoff value y˜is for Y˜
i
s and the time-s evaluation of
E[Z i1|Y 11 , ..., Y m1 ] are related by
E[Z i1|(∀j)NDj(y˜jt),Gt] = E[Z i1|(∀j 6= i)NDj(y˜jt), T¯i = y˜it,Gt] = E[Z i1|(∀j)[T¯j = y˜j],Gt]
= kimβ
i
ty˜
ακ1
1t ...y˜
ακm
mt ,
for α = αi, and κi = pi/p as above; here the last regression formula is quoted
from Lemma 2m of §5.4 below (cf. [18, §10.3.3 (Appendix 3)].)
Dropping subscripts, as in §5.2, one has by the conditional Bayes formula
(Prop. 1, §2.3) for the hypothetical output valuation:
G(t)L(t)−G(s)L(s) = λt(s−t)
∫
z1≤G(s)L(s)
Q(E[Zhyp1 |Y hyps ,G+t ] ≤ z1|G+t )dz1+o(s−t),
where Zhyp1 = Y
hyp
1 , by definition of the hypothetical agent. Now argue
as in §5.2 with G(t)L(t) in place of γ˜(t) to deduce the analogue of (15).
Rearranging, and using the Black-Scholes put formula, just as in §5.2, we
obtain to within o(s− t)/[(s− t)λt]
− 1
λt
· G(s)L(s)−G(t)L(t)
(s− t) = G(s)L(s)Φ
(
log(G(s)L(s)/G(t)L(t)) + σ˜2hyp/2
σ˜hyp
)
−G(t)L(t)Φ
(
log(G(s)L(s)/G(t)L(t)))− σ˜2hyp/2)
σ˜hyp
)
.
Now G(u)/G(t) = zˆu/zˆt is a ca`dla`g process (as a function of u, because each
y˜ju is, and the equations connecting the log-cutoffs and the hypothetical log-
cutoffs have non-singular matrix). So the right-hand side has a limiting value
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as s ↓ t. Hence G(u)L(u), and so G(u), is right-differentiable at u = t < 1.
Passing to the limit (as in §5.2)
− 1
λt
· d
du
[G(u)L(u)]
∣∣∣∣
u=t
= G(t)L(t)[2Φ(σ˜hyp/2)− 1].
Performing the differentiation, we obtain the following
G′(t)L(t) +G(t)L′(t) = −λtG(t)L(t)[2Φ(σ˜hyp/2)− 1],
G′(t)
G(t)
+
L′(t)
L(t)
= −λt[2Φ(σ˜hyp/2)− 1].
But zˆ(u) = zˆ(t)G(u) [and zˆ′(u) = zˆ(t)G′(u), so zˆ′(u)/zˆ(u) = G′(u)/G(u)], so
zˆ′(t)
zˆ(t)
+
L′(t)
L(t)
= −νhyp(t) := −λt[2Φ(σ˜hyp/2)− 1].
So for the hypothetical agent i we obtain explicitly that
log (zˆi(t)/zˆi(θ)) + log (L−i(t)/L−i(θ)) = −
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds,
by integrating from the date θ = θ− up to any time t prior to θ+ and re-
instating subscripts. So
log (zˆi(t)L−i(t)) = log (zˆi(θ)L−i(θ))−
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds,
using the definition of νihyp. But y
hyp
i (u) = zˆi(u)L−i(u), so
log yhypi (u) = log y
hyp
i (θ)−
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds. (18)
2. (Actual correlated observation dynamics). We apply the formula of
Theorem M to obtain the cutoffs y˜it for Y˜
i
t . To have common-sizing at time θ,
set γˆi(t) := y˜
i(u)/y˜i(θ) for θ = θ− < t < θ+. Returning to the corresponding
actual agent i, substitution from (18) into (16) gives
log γˆi(t) =
1
αiκ−i
(
log yhypi (θ)−
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds
)
+
1
κ0
(
...+
κj
αjκ−j
(
log(yhypj (θ))−
∫ t
θ
νjhyp(s)ds
)
+ ...
)
.
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We rearrange this to separate out two components displayed below. The first,
a continuous “inter-arrival discounting” term, generalizes the single observer
case, as a regression-weighted average over the hypothetical counterparts:
1
αiκ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds+
1
κ0
(
κ1
α1κ−1
∫ t
θ
ν1hyp(s)ds+
κ2
α2κ−2
(...) + ...
)
=
1
αiκ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds+
1
κ0
(
κ1
α1κ−1
∫ t
θ
ν1hyp(s)ds+
κ2
α2κ−2
∫ t
θ
ν2hyp(s)ds+ ...
)
=
∫ t
θ
νi(s)ds.
The second, a shift term, arises from adjustment of the initial mean in the
move from actual to hypothetical agent:
1
αiκ−i
log yhypi (θ) +
1
κ0
(
...+
κi
αiκ−i
log yhypi (θ) + ...
)
,
necessarily equivalent (after factoring through by αi, since(log y
i(u))/αi =
log y˜i(u)) to (log yi(θ))/αi for yi(θ) the re-initialization value at time θ. So
1
αi
log yi(u) = log y˜i(u) = − 1
αiκ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds
− 1
κ0
(
κ1
α1κ−1
∫ t
θ
v1hyp(s)ds+
κ2
α2κ−2
∫ t
θ
v2hyp(s)ds+ ...
)
.
So
log yit = −
1
κ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds
− 1
κ0
(
κ1
αi
α1
1
κ−1
∫ t
θ
v1hyp(s)ds+ κ2
αi
α2
1
κ−2
∫ t
θ
v2hyp(s)ds+ ...
)
.
3. (Actual correlated valuation dynamics). From Lemma 2m
β˜
i
= µ(αi, κσ˜
2
0)µ(κ
i
1, κσ˜
2
i ), and β˜m =
∏
j
µ(κj, σ˜
2
0j),
E[Zh1 |Yt = yt,Gt] = khmβ˜
h · β˜m · yκ11t ...yκmmt ,
using notation established there. Put
γ˜t = y
κ1
1t ...y
κm
mt .
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Take logarithms, substitute for κi log yit, next relabel j for i in the first term
and change order of summation in the second, to obtain
log γ˜t : = −
∑
i
κi
κ−i
∫ t
θ
νihyp(s)ds−
∑
i
∑
j
κi
κ0
αi
αj
κj
κ−j
∫ t
θ
vjhyp(s)ds
= −
∑
j
κj
κ−j
∫ t
θ
νjhyp(s)ds−
∑
j
∑
i
κi
κ0
αi
αj
κj
κ−j
∫ t
θ
vjhyp(s)ds
= −
∑
j
(
1 +
∑
i
αi
αj
κi
κ0
)
κj
κ−j
∫ t
θ
νjhyp(s)ds.
So
E[Z i1|Yt = yt,Gt] = kimβ˜
i · β˜m · γ˜t · gi∗[θ−].
5.4 Extending the two lemmas of §5.2
We extend Lemmas 1 and 2 of §5.2 to general m to establish:
γ˜it = E[Z
i
1|Yt = yt,Gt] = kimβityκ11t ...yκmmt .
We need some additional notation chosen so as to have the general case
appear typographically similar to the m = 1 case. Treating m-vectors y, z ∈
Rm+ as functions on {1, 2, 3, ..., m}, define y·z (and so y/z) and the exponential
yz in the pointwise sense; also write the product of the components of yz as
〈yz〉 := (y1z1)...(ymzm),
by analogy with inner products, so that
log〈yz〉 := 〈z, log y〉 = z1 log y1 + ...+ zm log ym.
In particular, identifying α > 0 with the vector all of whose components are
α (qua function constantly α), 〈yα〉 = (y1...ym)α. Finally, for convenience:
κi or κ
i
m := pi/p (i = 0, 1, ..., m), κ
i
1 := pi/(p0+pi) (i = 1, ..., m).
Lemma 1m (Valuation of Z1 given observation Y1 = y). Put κ =
(..., κjm, ...). Then
E[Z i1|Y1 = y, ] = ki〈yκ〉 for ki = kim = f i〈(1/f)κ〉.
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Proof. With the overbar notations as in Lemma 1, note from [18, Prop. 10.3]
that if T¯ has components T¯i = X¯Y¯i, where X¯ and (...Y¯i...) are independent,
with precision parameters p¯i, then for κi = p¯i/(p¯0 + p¯1 + ...+ p¯m) and δ > 0
E[X¯δ|T¯ = t] = Kδtδκ11 ...tδκmm = Kδ〈tδκ〉.
As before X¯ and Y¯i have conditional variances σ
2
0∆t and σ
2
i∆t. Take Kδ = 1
(its limiting value as ∆t→ 0; see Lemma 1) and note that p¯i = (1/σi)2. For
δ = αi, conditioning on Y1 = y, read off k
i
m = f
i〈(1/f)κ〉 from
E[Z i1|T¯ ] = E[f iXδ1 |T¯ ] = f i〈T¯ δκ〉 = f i〈(Y1/f)1/δ)δκ〉 = f i〈(y/f)κ〉. 
Lemma 2m (Time-t conditional law of the valuation of Z1, given
observation Yt). Conditional on Yt = y, the time-t distribution of the
time-1 valuation E[Z i1|Y1,G1] is that of
kiβ˜
i
m〈yκ〉Zˆ it ,
where, as in Lemma 1m and Lemma 2:
(i) κ := (κ1m, ..., κ
m
m) ;
(ii) for κ¯ = 1− κ0 = (p− p0)/p, and κi1 = pi/(p0 + pi),
β˜
i
m := β˜
i
indiv·β˜agg : β˜
i
indiv := µ(αi, κ¯σ˜
2
0)µ(κ
i
1, κ¯σ˜
2
i ), β˜agg =
∏
j
µ(κj, σ˜
2
0j);
(iii) Zˆ it is log-normal, its underlying mean-zero normal of variance
∑
j κ
2
j σ˜
2
0j.
In particular, this time-t distribution has mean given by
E[Z i1|Yt = y,Gt] = kimβ˜
i
indiv · β˜agg〈yκ〉.
Proof. From Lemma 1m we have for κ = (κ
1
m, ..., κ
j
m, ...)
E[Z i1|Y1,G1] = E[f iXαi1 |Y1,G1] = kim〈(Y1)κ〉.
Conditional on Yt = (...Y
j
t ...), by (13) of Lemma 2, with δ := κ
j
m for each j,
there is Zˆjt = Zˆjt(κ
j) of unit mean and variance κ2j σ˜
2
0j, with
Zˆjt = exp
(
κj [αjσ0W˜
0
1−t + σjW˜
j
1−t]−
1
2
κ2j σ˜
2
0j
)
,
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such that
(Y j1 )
κj = βj(Y jt )
κj Zˆjt, where β
j = (µ0t (αj)µ
j
t)
κjµ(κj, α
2
j σ˜
2
0j),
for µjt := µ(αj, α
2
j σ˜
2
j). So by substitution
E[Z i1|Y1,G1] = kim
∏
j≥1
βj(Y jt )
κj Zˆjt.
Now∏
j≥1
(µ0tµ
j
t)
κjµ(κj , α
2
j σ˜
2
0j) =
∏
j
µ(αj , σ˜
2
0)
κjµ(κj1, σ˜
2
i )
κjµ(κj , α
2
j σ˜
2
0j)
= µ(αi, κσ˜
2
0)µ(κ
i
1, κσ˜
2
i )
∏
j
µ(κj , α
2
j σ˜
2
0j),
where κ¯ :=
∑
j≥1 κ
j
m :=
∑
j≥1 pj/p = (p− p0)/p = 1− κ0. Put
Zˆ it : =
∏
j≥1
Zˆ ijt = exp
∑
j
(
κj [αjσ0W˜
0
1−t + σjW˜
j
1−t]−
1
2
κ2j σ˜
2
0j
)
= exp
∑
j≥1
(
κjαjσ0W˜
0
1−t −
1
2
κ2jα
2
j σ˜
2
0
)
exp
∑
j≥1
(
κjσjW˜
j
1−t −
1
2
κ2j σ˜
2
j
)
(since σ˜20j = α
2
j σ˜
2
0+ σ˜
2
j). This is a product of independent terms each of unit
expectation. The product has variance
∑
j κ
2
j [σ˜
2
0+ σ˜
2
j ] =
∑
j κ
2
j σ˜
2
0j .We arrive
at
E[Z i1|Yt,Gt] = kimβi〈Y κt 〉Zˆ it . 
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